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Abstract 
There is a growing disconnect between the need to bolster the multilateral trading system and the 
willingness of the world’s major economies to cooperate to do so. Concerted action on trade reform 
can help to support the process of global rebalancing and improve growth performance. Rather than 
repeat past calls to complete the WTO Doha round talks and refrain from protectionist actions, the 
G20 should build on the experience of the East Asia and Pacific region and commit to a specific trade 
cost reduction target and support greater plurilateral cooperation on regulatory matters under the 
umbrella of the WTO. 
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Introduction
*
 
In the last 20 years it has not proven possible for governments to agree to new rules of the game in the 
WTO for policies affecting trade and international investment flows. The 2001 Doha Development 
Round remains deadlocked. The July 2014 refusal by India to adopt the protocol required to 
implement a new Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) that was agreed by all WTO Ministers at the 
2013 WTO Ministerial Conference is just the latest example of a pattern of snatching defeat from the 
jaws of victory. As argued by many observers, there is a growing disconnect between the need for 
international cooperation to address policy spillovers and to bolster the global trading system and the 
capacity of the WTO to deliver what is needed.  
Reasons for this disconnect include geo-political developments (e.g., the rapid growth of China) 
and the emergence of a multi-polar global economy (“the rise of the rest”), and diminishing 
significance of the traditional trade policy instruments that are the main focus of the WTO (Hoekman, 
2014a). One consequence has been increasing recourse to new preferential trade agreements, including 
a number of ongoing so-called mega-regional negotiations. However, recent preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) and the prospective mega-regionals are not doing anywhere near enough to 
support higher rates of economic growth. There is much noise but less action when it comes to 
international cooperation to pursue the structural reforms that are needed for trade to play a significant 
role in global rebalancing. 
This neglect has a significant opportunity cost. Concerted action by the G20 on trade reform can 
help to support the process of moving towards a more balanced domestic consumption-driven growth 
strategy in major surplus countries, by promoting greater imports of goods and purchases of services 
and higher net exports by countries with large fiscal/external deficits. Service sector reforms and 
liberalization in all G20 countries can play an important role in supporting greater domestic 
consumption in China and other surplus countries and improving the competitiveness of deficit 
countries. The OECD and World Bank have documented that barriers to trade in services are often 
high and that there are significant costs associated with (differences in) “behind-the-border” product 
regulations and a lack of trade facilitation. A concerted focus on reducing trade costs, including by 
addressing weaknesses in trade-related infrastructure, should be part of the G20 growth agenda.
1
  
The G20 and trade: missed opportunities 
Starting with the first meeting of G20 Leaders at the end of 2008, G20 declarations on trade have had 
two elements: commitments to conclude the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda (DDA) expeditiously 
and to refrain from taking protectionist actions in response to the financial crisis. There has been 
limited emphasis on the need for supply side measures to expand trade as an element of the structural 
reforms needed to support the economic adjustments required for global rebalancing and sustaining 
higher income growth rates across the G20.  
Completion of the DDA offers a potential medium-term boost to global welfare, but would not do 
much to support the structural reforms that are needed for global rebalancing and growth. One reason 
is that the DDA is primarily about reductions in tariff bindings (maximum permitted tariffs) and 
agricultural support policies. Services – which account for 70+ percent of GDP in many economies 
and are a central element of the structural reform agenda – are only being pursued by a subset of WTO 
members, either through mega-regionals or negotiations on a Trade in Services Agreement. These 
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efforts are occurring outside the WTO and do not include Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
and most developing countries.  
The G20 commitment to refrain from taking protectionist actions was breached almost immediately 
(Evenett, 2009; 2013). While overall there has been relatively little recourse to major instances of 
protectionist action, G20 governments have continued to use all the instruments that are permitted by 
the WTO – antidumping and countervailing duties, safeguard actions – and have pursued a variety of 
measures, including subsidy programs and industrial policies, that support domestic economic activity 
over imports. 
Whatever one’s judgement on the effectiveness of the G20 standstill commitment, it is not geared 
towards expanding trade. The aim is defensive: to prevent an increase in trade costs for firms. The aim 
is not to lower costs and support more investment in tradable activities. What is needed are actions to 
increase and sustain the growth rates that are a precondition for improving employment and economic 
welfare. Much of what is called for in this regard will revolve around national measures to promote 
trade, but concerted action by the G20 would increase the payoffs from a growth perspective.  
Strengthening the global trading system for growth 
East Asian countries have been the stellar performers, most recently and notably China, in sustaining 
annual real income growth rates in the 5 to 10% range over many decades. Growth has been supported 
by a dramatic increase in trade, not just in overall value but also in terms of products and markets 
served. Export diversification was supported by extensive flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and participation in international production networks (“value chains”). Other regions have been much 
less successful in harnessing trade for growth than East Asia and other Pacific nations, reflecting less 
supportive business environments.  
Recent research has documented the importance of trade costs, including the costs of delays and 
uncertainty created by administrative procedures and red tape, as well as barriers to trade in services, 
as an important determinant of international competitiveness and the ability of firms in developing 
nations to participate in global value chains.
2
 This suggests policy should focus on lowering trade 
costs. An important element of what is needed to lower trade costs is trade facilitation – the types of 
measures that are called for in the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement – but the agenda goes far 
beyond that to span a variety of services-related elements (logistics, transport services), including 
transport and communications infrastructure. The latter will require investment, but research has 
concluded that such investments will have a high rate of return and infrastructure improvement is a 
good use of the excess savings/capital generated in surplus countries.  
Neither the WTO nor the PTAs that have become the primary focus of trade policy cooperation for 
G20 countries are helping to deliver higher economic growth. Trade agreements and ongoing 
negotiations are not aiming at significant opening of services markets or facilitating greater investment 
flows into infrastructure. Recent projects by the OECD and World Bank to measure the trade 
restrictiveness of prevailing policies in services sectors have documented high barriers in key sectors 
such as transport and professional services. This is consistent with research that finds that costs of 
trading services between PTA members are essentially the same as costs involving trade between 
firms that are not part of a PTA (Miroudot and Shepherd, 2014). In part this is a reflection of the fact 
that PTAs do little to reduce the excess costs of differences in regulation that impedes firms – 
especially services SMEs – from trading internationally.  
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International commercial policy cooperation looking forward requires a reconsideration of the trade 
governance structure and approaches that served the world very well during the 2
nd
 half of the 20
th
 
century. These centred on the negotiation of binding (enforceable) trade policy (liberalization) 
commitments on a reciprocal basis. This type of cooperation remains an important instrument to 
reduce trade barriers, but the DDA experience and the most recent debacle surrounding the non-
adoption of the TFA protocol into the WTO makes clear that a precondition for a successful 
negotiation is an agenda that permits a package deal to be constructed that is a Pareto improvement for 
everyone. The inability to get to yes in the DDA suggests this constraint cannot be satisfied with the 
agenda that has been the basis of negotiations to date. 
More fundamentally, the policies that create negative spillovers for trading partners revolve less 
and less around the tariffs, quotas and market access barriers that are the bread and butter of trade 
negotiations. Pursuit of reciprocity embedded in enforceable treaty-based commitments is not an 
effective instrument to address the trade-impeding effects of differences in regulatory regimes or to 
generate the joint action that is needed to significantly reduce trade-related costs and improve 
economic growth prospects. Different forms of cooperation are called for. Unilateral liberalization of 
trade barriers and national trade facilitation measures remain key instruments that are available to 
governments that seek to lower trade costs, but international cooperation offers important 
complementary mechanisms to help countries that to date have not been able to leverage trade 
opportunities for growth. Such cooperation includes assistance from development agencies for 
implementation of measures and investments that are needed to lower redundant costs for businesses. 
This is an agenda that does not lend itself well to the type of reciprocal negotiation that is the primary 
focus of trade agreements, whether the WTO or PTAs. The reason is that the national policies – or 
absence of policies – that generate higher trade costs mostly do not take the form of measures that 
discriminate against foreign suppliers. 
It is often taken as a given that the global trading system should be universal, rules-based, open, 
non-discriminatory and equitable, and that operates under the umbrella of the WTO.
3
 But the DDA 
deadlock, the proliferation of PTAs and the changing nature of global trade – the rise of international 
production/supply chain trade; expanding e-commerce/digital trade; the interdependencies and 
complementarities across “modes of supply” – make clear that changes in approaches are needed 
looking forward. Today’s global economy requires a flexible global trade governance structure that 
spans a greater set of trade- and investment-related policies than is covered by the WTO; that is 
supportive of deliberation and learning; more outcome-oriented in the sense of having clear objectives 
and focal points to guide action, monitor progress and ensure accountability for results; involves much 
greater engagement with and inputs from stakeholders in the design of international cooperation – 
especially smaller firms and consumer organizations – to identify areas that require joint action and 
have a high benefit/cost ratio; relies more on public-private partnerships in the implementation of 
cooperation and the monitoring of results/outcomes; and provides a much more effective framework 
for groups of countries that want to cooperate in new areas on a plurilateral basis to do so under the 
umbrella of the system as opposed to perceiving that they can only do this in the context of a PTA.
4
  
The trend towards PTAs and small group cooperation on trade-related policies outside the WTO 
makes clear that the global trading system cannot be monolithic. Nor should it be. There are good 
economic rationales for pursuing cooperation on regulatory and behind the border policies on a small 
group basis. One reason is that a uniform rule for a given policy area may be inefficient; another is 
that even if there is agreement that a given regulatory rule is optimal, the preconditions to 
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implementing it may not be satisfied by all countries. But whatever countries agree to do jointly 
should be implemented in ways that maximize the prospects for global growth and economic 
development. A necessary condition for this is that PTAs and related forms of small group cooperation 
of trade-related policies become more open and are fully transparent in the sense that there is full 
information on what is done by participants. It is in these areas that the G20 can and should take 
actions to bolster the global trading system.  
Significant effort will be required to develop specific proposals to make the global trading system 
more fit for purpose in an ever more integrated world economy and to build the high-level political 
support that is needed to implement change. The suggestion by Pangestu and Nellor (2014) for the 
G20 Leaders to appoint an Eminent Persons Group to make recommendations on the global trade 
regime and the design of WTO reforms is very pertinent and should be a priority for the 2014 G20 
Brisbane summit. Arguably a key focus should be to facilitate greater accommodation of diversity and 
“variable geometry” within the trading system.  
The required revamp need not involve a complete re-think. There is great scope to do more to use 
WTO mechanisms to assess the (spillover) impacts of policies and enhance understanding of how 
(differences in) regulatory regimes affect competitiveness; to increase the transparency of what is done 
in PTAs and identify ‘good practices’ that could be extended to or pursued by non-members; and to 
facilitate greater pursuit of plurilateral (small group) cooperation under the umbrella of the WTO as 
opposed to doing so only in the framework of a PTA.  
Two specific suggestions for the Brisbane G20 summit 
The B20 Trade Taskforce (2014) recommended four trade-focused action items for G20 Leaders: (i) 
rapidly implement and ratify the Bali TFA; (ii) reinforce the standstill on protectionism and wind back 
barriers introduced since 2008; (iii) develop country-specific supply chain strategies; and (iv) ensure 
PTAs realize better business outcomes. These all make good sense, and all involve actions where 
concerted action would provide a global public good. Unfortunately, one member of the G20 has 
blocked implementation of the TFA in the WTO, and the call for a standstill and rollback of 
protectionism has been a staple of G20 summits that has not been implemented by governments. 
Achieving the first two objectives will require the type of negotiation and package deal that the WTO 
has not been able to deliver for the DDA. Indeed, adding the rollback objective as an element of a 
post-DDA work program or as part of the road map to conclude the DDA may well be a precondition 
for realizing the goal. 
What follows makes two specific recommendations for G20 action on trade that are consistent with 
the B20 trade taskforce proposals and that would bolster the trading system. Both address issues that 
are of direct relevance to national growth agendas and the overall G20 economic growth objective; 
both will generate a public good, i.e., benefit the global economy, not just the G20 countries; both are 
Pareto-improving in that no country will lose from pursuing them; and neither requires complicated 
negotiations or a formal trade agreement/treaty. 
1. Agree on a specific trade cost reduction target 
Given the extant research on the links between trade expansion and growth; the key role that trade 
costs play as an impediment to trade and investment in/operation of international supply chains; and 
the importance of services in overall trade costs (transport and logistics services, related 
infrastructure), G20 leaders could help to ensure that trade does more to support their overall growth 
objective by committing to achieve a significant reduction in trade costs. In contrast to the 2 
percentage point increase in economic growth over 5 years that has been adopted as the primary focal 
point of the G20, which is endogenous and not under the direct control of governments, a trade cost 
reduction goal can be mapped to specific policies and instruments that governments do control, and 
Increased Export Performance and Competitiveness of Developing Countries: Mainly a China Story? 
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has the additional advantage that pursuit of trade cost reductions can and should involve the business 
community in each country.  
There is a precedent for adopting a trade cost target: APEC member governments agreed to a 
common trade facilitation performance target in two consecutive action plans starting in 2001– setting 
a goal of reducing trade costs by 10% over the 10 year period on a regional basis (APEC, 2012). The 
G20 could emulate this initiative, building on and learning from the APEC experience.
5
 One 
possibility would be for every G20 member to commit to reduce trade costs by at least 5 percent in 5 
years, and to use international data on trade costs reported by companies on a country-by-country 
basis as a baseline (e.g., World Bank, 2014).
6
 Trade cost reduction by the G20 would be in the interest 
of each country, but also benefit non-G20 nations and thus be a contribution to the global public good. 
It is also fully consistent with the G20 growth objective, as lowering trade costs are a mechanism to 
increase welfare (real incomes) (see, e.g., WEF, 2013; Estevadeordal and Taylor, 2013).  
A G20 commitment to a specific, numerical trade cost reduction target would also send an 
important signal to business community that the TFA debacle at the WTO in July 2014 does not mean 
that G20 Leaders do not believe that trade facilitation matters. A G20 trade cost reduction target would 
provide a concrete focal point for both national action and international cooperation along the lines of 
what is foreseen in the TFA, but not be limited to the issues that the TFA covers. Indeed, in practice it 
may be that the most important sources of trade costs and supply chain frictions are related to service 
sector policies or weaknesses in infrastructure, areas that are not covered by the TFA. A trade cost 
reduction target leaves it to governments, working with stakeholders (businesses, regulators, consumer 
organizations), to determine how best to reduce trade costs. It is fully consistent with the call by the 
B20 Trade Taskforce (2014) for the development of national supply chain development strategies, as 
these will have to center on the identification of specific supply chain frictions and actions to address 
these trade costs (for suggestions on how to do so, see, e.g., WEF, 2013; Hoekman, 2013).  
The value added of a joint G20 initiative on trade cost reduction is not just as an instrument to 
increase real incomes, but there is an important public good/collective action dimension. Realizing the 
objective will require high-level political attention to achieve the needed internal coordination within 
governments and external coordination across governments to pursue cross-border projects and 
cooperation. A G20 trade cost reduction initiative will also incentivize the relevant international 
organizations to focus their activities on assisting governments to reduce trade costs. 
If agreement on implementing the TFA has not been reached in the WTO before the Brisbane 
summit, an element of the proposed trade cost reduction initiative could be agreement by G20 Leaders 
to implement the TFA unilaterally as an open plurilateral agreement. The stance that has been taken by 
India implies that a formal WTO Plurilateral Agreement is not feasible, as India can be expected to 
block adoption of the TFA as a plurilateral agreement even it were to be applied on a MFN basis by 
those who join. But the G20 can commit to implementing the TFA and cooperating to provide 
assistance to developing countries that also decide to do so, along the lines called for in the TFA.
7
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2. Open up the PTA black box and support more plurilateral cooperation in Geneva 
Currently PTAs are regarded by policymakers as the default option for the pursuit of cooperation on 
trade policy matters not covered by the WTO. The B20 trade taskforce (2014) calls for Leaders to do 
more to ensure PTAs realize better business outcomes. An explicit focus on actions to achieve a trade 
cost reduction target on a country-by-country basis can help do so by focusing attention on what could 
be done through extant PTAs to lower trade costs. From a global trading system perspective the focus 
of attention should be on reducing the costs that are created by the plethora of different PTAs and their 
provisions, including differences in rules and regulations for identical products.  
As already noted, there are good reasons for small group cooperation on regulatory matters given 
the great diversity in circumstances and priorities for the 160 members of the WTO. Recent 
experience in and outside the WTO illustrates that it is difficult to attain agreement among the WTO 
membership as a whole on new disciplines for trade and investment related policies. Plurilateral 
cooperation and “variable geometry” is and will be an inherent feature of the global trading system. 
The G20 countries are of course the main drivers behind plurilateral trade and investment 
arrangements. Such arrangements can and do have negative consequences for non-members when they 
result in greater discrimination against non-parties. But they also may generate benefits for non-
members. 
From both a global welfare and global trading system perspective the G20 should take action to 
ensure that there is: (i) greater transparency and knowledge regarding both the negative spillovers and 
the positive economic impacts of implementation of PTAs and (ii) greater pursuit of small group 
cooperation under the umbrella of the WTO as opposed to outside it. Progress on the latter front does 
not require a major revamp of the global trading system—what it requires is a commitment to make 
greater use the existing multilateral trade framework to pursue small group cooperation.  
There are many policy areas that can generate negative spillovers for other countries and that 
should be of interest to groups of countries to discuss, independent of their income level or size. 
Examples are export restrictions, which are detrimental to net importing countries, ‘green’ subsidies 
(ranging from minimum feed-in prices for electricity generated from renewable resources to subsidies 
for the development or use of specific technologies), and policies constraining digital trade and e-
commerce—an area that is of critical important to SMEs. Some of these issues are addressed in recent 
PTAs, others not.  
G20 Leaders can take two action in this connection: (i) commit to joint action to enhance the 
transparency of their PTA activities by doing more to engage with the WTO membership as a whole 
and discuss their objectives and achievements, and what has been learned in the process of 
implementing specific initiatives in the context of PTAs; and (ii) commit to do more to pursue 
discussions and potential cooperation on “new” issues under the umbrella of the WTO as opposed to 
limiting these to bilateral or PTA settings outside the WTO.  
On the first suggestion, the Asia-Pacific region again provides examples that might be emulated, in 
the process helping to link initiatives that aim at market integration and policy cooperation. The 
Pacific Alliance countries, a deep integration effort that spans Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, with 
Costa Rica expected to join soon, are pursuing a variety of initiatives in policy areas spanning 
integration of stock markets; liberalizing the movement of business people and tourists; opening up 
access to procurement; simplification and adoption of a common set of rules of origin; collaboration in 
trade promotion; and engaging the business community to identify priorities for joint action, to name 
just a few. A distinct feature of the Alliance is that it is open to new members and to observers – many 
OECD members and countries in the region are observers. But little is known in Geneva about what 
concretely the Alliance is doing in different regulatory areas. The same is true of integration initiatives 
involving other advanced Pacific countries – e.g., Australia, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore among 
others, and ASEAN.  
Increased Export Performance and Competitiveness of Developing Countries: Mainly a China Story? 
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The basic idea is for the G20 Leaders to commit to regularly explain what they are doing in PTAs 
to non-members on policy issues and areas that are not covered by the WTO, thus opening what is to a 
significant extent a black box for non-members. This process could be supported by the relevant 
international secretariats – e.g., the APEC Policy Support Unit, the OECD, etc. 
Turning to the second suggestion, there is no reason why cooperation on issues not covered by the 
WTO must be pursued solely through PTAs. The WTO allows for members to form plurilateral 
agreements that apply only to signatories. A clear commitment by the G20 to support efforts by groups 
of countries to agree to new plurilateral agreements would be an important signal that G20 Leaders 
recognize that small group cooperation under WTO auspices is a feasible and desirable option.  
A major constraint on the pursuit of new plurilateral agreements in the WTO has been the need for 
all WTO members to agree to their incorporation into the WTO framework, whether or not they join 
the agreement. That is, all WTO Members must agree to accept new plurilateral initiatives, even if 
these bind just a few countries. The consensus constraint effectively has led countries to rely 
exclusively on PTAs as mechanisms for cooperation on regulatory policies and new rule-making. 
There are good arguments for consensus and for the linkage strategies that it allows. But consensus 
has become an impediment on moving forward on any subject, including those where all agree that 
moving forward is desirable.  
As discussed in a number of recent papers – e.g., WEF (2010), Draper and Dube (2013), Hoekman 
and Mavroidis (2013) – greater use of plurilateral agreements under WTO auspices could be 
facilitated by agreement on a ‘code of conduct’ that lays out criteria that should be satisfied by 
proposed plurilateral agreements. The aim would be to ensure countries that do not participate that 
such agreements will not be detrimental to them and provide greater assurances to the countries that 
want to pursue new plurilateral agreements in the WTO that investing efforts to do so is not a waste of 
time and resources. This issue should be a priority among those considered by the Eminent Persons 
Group to assess ideas for global trading system reform that has been proposed by Pangestu and Nellor 
(2014) and by Bark et al. (2014).  
Conclusion 
G20 discussions and declarations on trade have been limited to WTO negotiations and promises to 
refrain from taking protectionist actions as part of national responses to the 2008 financial crisis and 
its aftermath. Neither has been particularly effective – the Doha Round remains blocked and G20 
countries have taken over 2000 trade-restrictive measures.
8
 There is little prospect for greater success 
on these two avenues than has been observed to date. What is needed instead are specific 
commitments by G20 leaders to pursue actions on the trade front that will support both the growth 
objective and strengthen the global trading system looking forward. A G20 trade cost reduction 
commitment and a pledge to engage on plurilateral initiatives under the WTO umbrella would both 
help achieve the growth goal that the G20 has set itself and support the development of the global 
trading system. 
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